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“Immersion and Defamiliarization: Experiencing Literature and World” 
By Miranda Anderson and Stefan Iversen 
Final draft submitted for the Poetics Today issue Unnatural and Cognitive Perspectives on 
Literary Studies: A Theory Crossover 
 
Introduction1 
Analysis of narrative fiction’s capacity to induce immersion and defamiliarization has a long 
history in the fields of literary and aesthetic theory. Most theoretical treatments of the two 
concepts give privilege and normative impetus to one type of response or related type of text. 
In this article we set out to rethink the concepts of immersion and defamiliarization by bringing 
them into dialogue. This dialogue involves an investigation of overlaps and differences 
between two theoretical paradigms, cognitive narratology and unnatural narratology. 
   Our aim is to track evidence of, and to advance, understandings of the forms and 
functions of immersion and defamiliarization, which have been inspired by cognitive and 
unnatural approaches to narratology. Where these concepts have been associated with dualistic 
notions of cognition and purely mimetic notions of narrative, immersion and defamiliarization 
have come to seem in opposition in a way that we are seeking to show is too simplistic. The 
three literary texts, which provide illustrative material, share thematic or formal affinities with 
dreams and with grief, two issues themselves invested in the dialectics of the real and unreal. 
In Chaucer’s The Book of the Duchess, a narrator’s dream vision brings him face to face with 
grief; in Borges’ “The Circular Ruins”, a character turns out to be not only creating with dreams 
but created from a dream, which produces grief; in Kafka’s “A Country Doctor” a narrative 
voice performs grief in an immersion-challenging setting that some readers refer to as 
dreamlike.2 The article consists of the following parts: an introduction to the concept of 
immersion as seen from cognitive narratology and to the concept of defamiliarization as seen 
from unnatural narratology; the three readings of Chaucer, Borges and Kafka; and finally the 
conclusion. 
Our discussion is framed by two sets of distinctions, which we have brought in to help 
distinguish some of the dominant aspects in play when experiencing narrative fiction. The 
distinctions originate from a famous passage in Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s autobiography, 
Biographia Literaria (1817) where Coleridge tells the story about a mutual challenge between 
him and his colleague, William Wordsworth. They both agree to invest in one of what they call 
the “two cardinal points of poetry”:  
 
                                                          
1 An earlier version of this essay was presented by both authors at the Department of Culture and Aesthetics, 
Stockholm University, 4 November 2016. Miranda Anderson’s research on this paper was supported by a 
research grant at the University of Edinburgh by the Arts and Humanities Council’s for the History of 
Distributed Cognition project. 
2 As noted by a reviewer, the structural, thematic and functional affinities and differences between the 
phenomena of dreams and emotional states and  the experience of narrative and literature holds potential for 
interesting investigations, particularly when approached from an unnatural or cognitive perspective. Such 
investigations, however, lie outside the scope of this article.    
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[Coleridge’s] endeavours should be directed to persons and characters supernatural, or at 
least romantic, yet so as to transfer from our inward nature a human interest and a 
semblance of truth sufficient to procure for these shadows of imagination that willing 
suspension of disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic faith. Mr. Wordsworth 
on the other hand was to propose to himself as his object, to give the charm of novelty to 
things of every day, and to excite a feeling analogous to the supernatural, by awakening 
the mind’s attention from the lethargy of custom, and directing it to the loveliness and 
the wonders of the world before us…(Coleridge 1817, chapter XIV) 
 
The first cardinal point, pursued by Coleridge, is what others have called verisimilitude. The 
challenge he faces is to make the unreal or supernatural seem real, to suspend the audiences’ 
disbelief and make them empathize with the “shadows of imagination”. While Wordsworth is 
to use the invented to restore the reader’s experiences of what lies outside the text, to purge the 
numbness of perceptual habits and direct the attention of the reader to the “wonders of the 
world”. Our take on these two strategies for securing the “sympathy of the reader” is to think 
of them not as oppositions but as continuums. Both the suspension of disbelief and the direction 
of attention can be seen as scalar phenomena, as axes; aspects of a text can suspend disbelief 
to a higher or lesser degree while other aspects of a text can be more or less interested in either 
steering the reader into the invented world or in returning the reader to the world outside the 
text. If one combines these two continuums, the following diagram of reader responses induced 
by textual strategies emerges:  
 
Suspension of disbelief  
    High degree   Low degree 
 
Direction of attention  
Fictional text   1   2 
    
    
World before us  3   4 
 
 Traditionally, immersion has been conceived of as transparently directing attention towards 
what has been referred to as the “language-independent reality”3 that is presented by the 
fictional text (position 1), while defamiliarization is seen as operating through directing the 
reader’s attention to the artificial nature of the construction of the fictional world (position 2). 
Drawing on recent developments in cognitive narratology and unnatural narratology we want 
to question this view. It is our aim to show that it is productive to distinguish between different 
types of readerly engagement, typified under the continuums of suspension of disbelief and 
direction of attention, although dichotomous or oppositional understandings of the processes 
of immersion and defamiliarization over simplify matters. We will do this by arguing that 
immersion may also take place in texts with lower degrees of suspension of disbelief (position 
2) and that immersion and defamiliarization can both serve to imitate and direct the attention 
                                                          
3 Ryan 2001: 14-15. 
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of the reader towards their immersion in the world (position 3) and by means of providing new 
perceptions lead the reader to question the nature of what lies beyond the text (position 4). 
 
Immersion and Cognitive Narratology 
Where does the reader’s mind stop and the book begin? Immersion, the concept that the reader 
is transported into, engaged with or absorbed by a book, in many respects seems to intuit and 
anticipate a distributed cognitive approach to literary experience.4 Distributed cognition, which 
latterly has been renamed by narratologists as 2nd Generation cognition (Kukkonen and 
Caracciolo 2014), is the claim that cognition (or the mind) is distributed across brain, body and 
world, rather than being something merely brain-based or metaphysical. In the words of Andy 
Clark and David Chalmers, it asks the question “Where does the mind stop and the rest of the 
world begin?” (1998). Empirical research in the cognitive sciences that have provided evidence 
of the ways in which cognition is embodied, embedded, enacted and extended into the world 
also serve to endorse, supplement and to interrogate our understandings of immersion in 
narrative, with narrative instantiations in turn illuminating scientific and philosophical insights 
and hypotheses .  
Immersion in fiction has, at least since Plato, been compared with our immersion in the 
world. In twentieth century postmodern accounts, the notion that in life we are already 
immersed in fiction, is due to a view of language as an arbitrary symbolic system by which we 
are constituted and processed. Early cybernetic accounts more positively viewed humans as the 
processors, but the emphasis on cognition as equivalent to information processing again 
emphasised the virtual nature of constructs and elided the significance of embodiment and the 
physical environment. Recent distributed cognitive accounts, which often draw on earlier 
phenomenological notions, instead emphasise the mutually constitutive relationship of 
language, body and world. This more holistic notion of worldly immersion entails that narrative 
techniques and structures are formed in relation to, and give insights into, structures in the 
physical world. Notions of literary immersion that have arisen from distributed cognitive 
approaches extend the language-body-world circuit to include storyworlds (Anderson 2015). 
The cognitive enactment of a storyworld by the reader is also a cognitive enactment of the 
reader by the storyworld: reader and narrative bring forth one another. Predictive models of 
cognition that have recently emerged, simply echo these theoretical stances with Jakob 
Hohwy’s predictive coding (2013), explicitly arguing for the virtual and fictional nature of our 
access to the world, as with classical cognitive science and postmodern accounts, while Andy 
Clark’s predictive processing (2016),  and Shaun Gallagher and Micah Allen’s (2016) 
predictive engagement theory respectively argue for progressively more enactive 
understandings of our relation tothe world. 
Jean-Marie Schaeffer’s Why Fiction? describes immersion in fiction as a manifestation 
of the general human capacity for cognitive simulation: 
 
…one cannot understand what fiction is if one does not take as a starting point the 
fundamental mechanisms of “doing-as-if” – of ludic-feint – and of imaginative 
                                                          
4 Use of the term immersion in narratology derived from discussions on virtual reality and digital media (see 
Ryan 2001) 
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simulation, of which the genesis is observed in the games of role-playing and the 
daydreaming of early childhood… (2010 [1999]: xii) 
 
As with predictive accounts of cognition that have since emerged, “this modelling 
virtualization” is described as “one of the essential competences of human consciousness” (59). 
This virtualization is also a multileveled hierarchical account: what characterises fictional 
immersion is accession to a state of immersion, the effects of which are then neutralized at the 
level of conscious attention (163). Though the nature, extent and limits of the effects and of 
their neutralization are in need of more research, with cognitive approaches particularly 
promising greater insights. 
 
Notably, this is similar in structure to notions of how the mirror neuron system operates via a 
combination of automatic sensorimotor resonance in observers of actions, emotions and action 
words, which is supplemented by super mirror neurons inhibiting actual imitation (Rizzolatti 
and Sinigaglia 2008). Furthermore, it suggests the partial nature of immersive states despite 
the apparently total nature of the fusion experienced between reader and narrative, which 
implies the polythetic nature of the self. Schaeffer also distinguishes between different forms 
of immersion postures induced in readers which relate to the distinctive types of immersion 
vectors offered by different media. The view then is one of both continuity and differences 
across cognitive processes, readers and media.  
A focus on immersion type phenomena by cognitive narrative approaches has seemed 
to put cognitive narratologists at odds with the unnaturals’ focus on works or elements in works 
that are in some way impossible or antimimetic and that may seem more in tune with 
defamiliarizing techniques. Immersion and defamiliarization have come to seem in opposition 
in a way that implies too simplistic a definition of both terms. Even in Auerbach’s seminal 
Mimesis, mimesis is not just immersive but also is the means whereby “man used his language 
to discover his world anew” which aligns it with defamiliarization ([1946] 2003: 183). More 
recently, Alva Noë’s Strange Tools makes an argument for art as a philosophical practice, 
which by making us aware of the ways in which we are organised by structures in the world, 
“gives us the possibility of reorganizing ourselves” (2016: xiii). The roots of such notions 
derive from the phenomenological tradition, which like defamiliarization seeks to reveal the 
ways in which we are always already caught up in mental panoramas. The notions of 
defamiliarization at the heart of mimetic and cognitive accounts throws into question any easy 
dichotomy between these concepts or between cognitive and unnatural approaches.  
The close association of defamiliarization and immersion goes back to the emergence 
in Western European culture of narrative analysis from scriptural exegesis; this also forms the 
background context to The Book of the Duchess. The coming down to earth of exegesis, with 
the growth of commentary on contemporary secular auctores, was influenced by the thirteenth 
century revival of Aristotelian epistemological ideas which gave the human faculties and 
perception “a new dignity” (Minnis and Scott 1998 [1988]: 197). The epistemological 
underpinning to this hermeneutical development bears comparison with the recent cognitive 
turn’s emphasis on embodiment and science-based approaches: it suggests that there may be a 
connection between theoretical turns with more embodied and grounded notions of human 
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nature and an optimistic openness to the surface level value of language, its substance, style 
and matter. Dante (contra earlier scriptural hermeneutics) prioritises the literal meaning, the 
surface level, as the necessary foundation on which allegorical, moral or anagogical meanings 
are built, while Boccaccio figures narratives’ polysemousness simulatively as a plurality of 
paths available to the reader  (2001 [c. 1360]). Boccaccio asserts that it is poetry’s very 
strangeness and opacity that makes it superior to philosophy: “…poesy…brings forth strange 
and unheard-of creations of the mind;…adorns the whole composition with unusual 
interweaving of words and thoughts; and thus it veils truth in a fair and fitting garment of 
fiction” (258). It is its very strangeness, its capacity for defamiliarization, he argues, which 
enables its capacity to create immersive simulations, as poets “raise flights of symbolic steps 
to heaven, or make thick-branching trees spring aloft to the very stars, or go winding about 
mountains to their summits” (259). Fittingly Boccaccio’s examples serve not only as pithy 
illustrations for his claim as to poets’ God-like capacity for creation, but simulate an ascension 
towards the “high and noble”, to which through practical effort, Boccaccio claims, poetry leads 
(259). This notion of poesy, so leads etymologically to poiesis, creation, and developmentally 
in turn on to autopoiesis, self-creation, with homo viator rising upward via fiction’s scaffolding 
structures and transforming into the self-creating homo faber. 
More recently, the most influential work in narrative studies on the concept of 
immersion, has been Marie-Laure Ryan’s Narrative as Virtual Reality, which describes 
immersion as “the experience through which a fictional world acquires the presence of an 
autonomous, language-independent reality populated with live human beings”, such that the 
reader’s “consciousness relocates itself” to this other world (2001: 14-15, 104). This work 
originally published in 2001, has recently been revised and its addition of research and insights 
from cognitive science, reflects just how useful work in this area has been to fleshing out 
concepts of immersion. Nonetheless, it continues to define immersion as “a state of forgetting 
language and losing oneself in the textual world” (136). Therefore Rita Felski’s observation in 
2008 on the limitation of this definition remains valid, as she points out that Ryan  
 
…fails to consider the possibility of being seduced by a style, assuming that any attention 
to language will be purely cerebral and analytical in nature...Here language is not a hurdle 
to be vaulted over in the pursuit of pleasure, but the essential means of achieving it. We 
need only think of those moments when a reader, on opening a book, is drawn in by a 
cadence of tone, by particular inflections and verbal rhythms, by an irresistible 
combination of word choice and syntax. (2008: 63) 
 
As well as supporting understandings of the mechanisms that enable our experience of being 
immersed into a text in the more conventional sense described by Ryan (position 1 in the reader 
response matrix), cognitive approaches suggest that immersion may also be produced by an 
aesthetic and affective engagement owing to techniques that do not efface but rather draw a 
reader’s attention to the surface layer of the text (position 2 in the matrix). The foregrounding 
of the text’s fictionality ‘seeing the represented object while knowing that one sees a mimeme” 
is what enables fictional immersion according to Jean-Marie Schaeffer (2010 [1999]: 165). 
Similarly, Merja Polvinen argues that “awareness of the fictionality of fiction does not 
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constitute an anomalous rational action that works against emotional immersion – instead it 
is…necessary for immersion to happen in the first place” (2012: 108-9). Marco Caracciolo’s 
empirical analysis of reader responses on Amazon shows that the emotions evoked are 
interwined with readers’ judgements (2013). As Boccaccio earlier intuited, Keith Oatley 
similarly argues that emotional engagement is not opposite to but can instead be caused by 
defamiliarization, which through foregrounding texts and affording aesthetic effects, leads to 
“emotional reflection and reappraisal” (Oatley 2016; Miall 2008). Evidence that perceptual 
processes can be slowed down by features such as the weak implicatures, functional shifts and 
the rhetoric of literary language (Davis 2007; Wilson 2011; van Peer 2007) more generally 
suggests immersion and defamiliarization can be cooperative.  
Yet, in line with more conventional notions of immersion as occurring via a see-through 
surface level text (position 1), distributed cognitive approaches often emphasise the importance 
of the transparency of the resource which we use as part of our mind. This tension as regards 
concepts about immersion can be helpfully compared with a tension between theoretical 
strands in the distributed cognition framework. For example, in relation to embodied cognition, 
more functionalist approaches such as Clark’s (2008) would argue that the specificity of the 
resource at the sensorimotor frontier may be negligible (position 1 or 3), while others, such as 
Damasio (2000) and Noë (2004), would argue for the special role that the specifics of a 
particular body or resource play (position 2 or 4, in terms of the attention demanded by, and 
the significance of, the role of the surface level of the text (2) or of the body and physical world 
(4)). We argue for a middle path between these, where while the particularity of the resource 
may have a distinctive consequence in one context or as regards one function, in another 
context or as regards another function, the difference may be negligible (Anderson 2015). In 
terms of immersion in a text this means that the surface level parameters, such as the stylistic 
features (position 2) or the physical specifics of body and world (position 4) may vary in terms 
of their significance to cognitive processing and outcomes. 
Distributed cognitive approaches have led to a focus on the embodied nature of 
immersion, which is underpinned by new insights into our cognitive mechanisms. We can take 
the position of the narrator through references to bodily movements or sensations which trigger 
“sensorimotor perceptual simulations in the reader” (Bolens, viii). Furthermore, as has been 
shown in a number of experiments (Fischer and Zwaan 2008, Speer et al. 2009), immersion 
evokes our specific, though changeable, embodied self with the degree of immersion variably 
effected by our previous cognitive repertoire and enactive experience. To an extent, narratives 
simulate our everyday immersion in the world by triggering equivalent or parallel cognitive 
processes; there are elements of continuity across immersion in a text or the world (positions 1 
and 3). When we process language referring to sensorimotor actions, “our sensorimotor cortex 
becomes automatically activated in much the same way as if we were acting out the represented 
actions and perceptions ourselves” (Kuzmičová 2014: 276; Caracciolo 2011). Moreover, it is 
not just fictional bodies that we are immersed in and enact but fictional environments, since it 
is through the body that we experience space and time (Merleau-Ponty [1962] 2006; Gallagher 
2005; Caracciolo 2013).  
Our perceptual modelling of the world has been shown to be transferred across to the 
ways in which we model narratives, for example, narratives which are mimetic of the salient 
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features of our cognitive processing, rather than of the objective dimensions of the referent, are 
the most vivid (Jajdelsaka et al. 2010). It has been observed that perception and memory 
particularly attend to spatial or temporal boundaries (Jajdelska et al. 2010; Conway 2005); this 
suggests that narratives that use such markers, which interrupt the flow of the text, can in fact 
be more vivid and immersive exactly through the use of such sequential structuring.  There are 
also significant differences between world and narrative modelling, such as with action 
observation, for example, as when we read that the excited young woman swiftly “turns a page” 
the more exact nature of the simulation must wait for the arrival of the word “page” (Fischer 
and Zwaan 2008: 836). Thus as well as continuity there can be a distinctive aspect to our 
processing of narrative simulations.  
Narrative simulations trigger inferences based on our prior personal experiences. The 
episodic memory underlies not only our capacity to construct counterfactual hypotheses about 
the future, but also our capacity to imagine fictional scenarios (Hassabis and Maguire 2007). 
Additionally, a narrative may in turn recalibrate our memories, so that the real world is made 
anew, as our memories both flesh out and immerse us further in the narrative and thereby shift 
our perceptions of the past not only in the storyworld but also in our own world, and alter 
perceptions of the present and future likelihoods and possibilities afforded by the storyworld 
and life revitalising our mental panoramas (Anderson 2016a). The particular term “immersion”, 
as with notions of “flow” (Montero 2016), has been taken to imply a more cognitively passive 
role than now often appears to be the case; we argue that readers bring to their immersion in 
the text their experience of the world (position 3), which through being enacted via engagement 
with the text may in turn be modified (position 4), despite or because of the text’s very 
fictionality. Our capacity to generalise away from particulars (Fischer and Zwaan 2008), means 
that though, for example, we may not have performed a pirouette we are to an extent able to 
understand the action through an experience of turning, with the types of vivid and detailed 
instructions provided by authors supplementing our capacity to take imaginative leaps beyond 
our usual cognitive constraints.  
Felski helpfully emphasises the two-way nature of our relation to texts: “reading is far 
from being a one-way street; while we cannot help but impose ourselves on literary texts, we 
are also, inevitably, exposed to them” (Felski 2008: 3). Yet the terminology here, perhaps 
unintentionally, suggests unwillingness: “impose” and “expose”. Another way of framing this 
would be in terms of a notion of a literary distributed cognition that occurs via textual 
autopoiesis that bring reader and work forth together (Anderson 2016b). Enactivist notions of 
cognition as sense-making helpfully make clear the mutual implication of affective and 
evaluative responses (Colombetti 2014). The experiential emphasis associated with immersion 
and the more reflective stance associated with defamiliarization in our sense-making of 
narratives are intertwined cognitive phenomena. The mutual enactment of narrative by reader 
and reader by narrative is complementary to understandings of cognition as distributed across 
brain, body and world, which includes by extension the storyworlds, which add to the thousand 
virtual coordinates through which we more generally orient ourselves and enact our worlds. 
 
Defamiliarization and Unnatural Narratology 
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So far, our attempt to illustrate the many overlaps and interdependencies between processes of 
immersion and defamiliarization has focused on getting an up do date understanding of 
immersion. In what follows we are turning our attention to defamiliarization. Through a return 
to Shklosvky’s early texts, we aim to tease out productive revisions to common understandings 
of the term. Further, we shall use this rereading of Shklovsky to sharpen our understanding of 
what unnatural narrative elements might be. The term “unnatural” is used by usto designate 
rhetorical devices that de-automatize the reader’s acts of perception and understanding through 
what we call processes of permanent defamiliarization. 
Defamiliarization is traditionally presented as an aesthetic meta-device, often tied to 
normative ideas about the autonomy of experimental literature. Schmid finds that 
“defamiliarisation provides the formalist basis of the concept of deviation”, where deviation 
entails artistic enterprises that “reject the ideas of imitation, reproduction, and mimesis” 
(Schmid 2005: 98). While Margolin states that the perspective of early Shklovsky and early 
Russian Formalism as such was “aestheticist, ahistorical, reductive, and mechanistic”, with a 
narrow focus on analyzing artistic procedures capable of defamiliarizing “that which is or has 
become familiar or taken for granted” (Margolin 2004: 815). The concept of defamiliarization, 
emerging from such representations, would typically conceive of it as tied to what we have 
labeled position 2 in the matrix: defamiliarizaiton is thus seen as directing attention to the 
artificiality of the work of art by resisting suspension of disbelief. 
We want to question this understanding. Despite the insights they offer, these 
representations of the concept run the risk of reducing the explanatory power of Shklovsky’s 
proposal by limiting the reach of defamiliarization to certain types of art, by downplaying its 
focus on readerly dynamics and, most importantly, by highlighting the formal rather than the 
functional aspects of the processes it attempts to describe. Our reading is in some respects 
comparable to other recent uses of the concept that stress that defamiliarization should be seen 
as a reading effect. Examples of such an approach are to be found in Robinson’s Estrangement 
and the Somatics of Literature: Tolstoy, Shklovsky, Brecht (2008) and in “The Storied Lives of 
Non-Human Narrators” by Bernaerts et al. (2014). Bernaerts et al. consider defamiliarization 
as “the effect that literary texts can bring about on readers by challenging their ideas about 
what counts as ’normal’ or ’predictable’ in a given genre or narrative situation” (Bernaerts et 
al. 2014: 73). 
What we want to present is a rhetorical reading of the concept or a reading of the 
concept as rhetorical.5 This understanding of defamiliarization then becomes tied to a certain 
way of thinking about unnatural narratives. We shall move forward through a brief look at the 
role played by the concept in theories of unnatural narratives. Given the often experimental 
nature of texts deemed unnatural, it is no surprise that the term “defamiliarization” appears 
quite often among practitioners of unnatural narratology. Among other places it is referenced 
in Alber et al. 2010, in Richardson 2011, in Weese 2014, and discussed in Richardson 2015 
(24-25). Only in one case has the concept been used to distinguish the unnatural (Iversen 2016). 
Reader dynamics, however, has played a significant role in the most elaborate attempt at 
explaining what unnatural narratives are and how they may function.  
                                                          
5 The notion of rhetorical refers in this context to an interest in intentions, purposes, functions and audience 
reactions, as well as in form and aesthetics.    
9 
 
In Unnatural Narrative: Impossible Worlds in Fiction and Drama, Jan Alber lists nine 
“reading strategies” (Alber 2016: 47), ranging from “more or less automatic” processes of 
world making to more interpretative “conscious or reflexive moves” (55), that “may be used 
by recipients to make sense of impossible scenarios or events” (47). Brian Richardson argues 
in his section on the “reader” in Unnatural Narrative: Theory, History, and Practice (2015) 
that unnatural texts give rise to a multitude of different types of ideal readers in that readers of 
strange literature “are required to perform several different tasks and perhaps take on several 
personae” (Richardson 2015: 44). Sometimes this entails taking different positions 
simultaneously, while at other times it means making a choice between mutually exclusive 
positions. An example of the former appears when a text produces a “dual-level reader” (44) 
who is invited to read the text both on a mimetic level and on a level where the principles 
behind the mimetic are violated or disrupted. Examples of the latter are to be found when 
reading self-contradictory narratives. According to Richardson such narratives give rise to 
different implied readers such as readers that attempt to “naturalize”, readers that experience 
the contradictions as “authorial free play”, or readers that on the basis of the text “reject the 
mimetic conventions altogether” (46). In Richardson’s gallery of possible implied readers we 
thus find both those who move towards re-cognizing the otherworldly and weird and those who 
for various reasons resist bringing unnatural elements back into the fold of the everyday and 
well-known. 
It is to this second, non-naturalizing position that the following subscribes, moving 
forward through a return to Shklovsky. It is easy to see why the formalistic, work-directed 
aspects of Shklovky’s thinking have been dominant in the reception of this work. Theory of 
Prose does in fact show, what was for its time, a revolutionary interest in the devices of literary 
art.6 But we want to claim that the concept of defamiliarization is also, perhaps even primarily, 
invested in an inquiry into what Shklovksy calls “the purpose of art” (Shklovsky 1991: 6). This 
purpose is closely tied to what is referred to as the “economics” of understanding.  
The basic dichotomy, guiding the argumentation in Theory of Prose (especially so in 
the first chapter, “Art as device”), is not between specific formal devices and conventional 
stylistic features but between two ways of making sense. Shklovksy talks about “the general 
law governing the economy of mental effort” (4) as something opposed to the processes 
initiated through interaction with works of art. In everyday sense-making, the guiding principle 
is efficiency, achieved through processes of shortcutting, fragmentation and habitualisation, 
which is an intuition that has since been confirmed by cognitive science and is what Shklovksy 
calls “automatization”. This form of automatic perception makes us faster at handling the 
everyday demands of the outer and inner world but at the cost of tangibility and sensibility: the 
“object passes before us, as if it were prepackaged” (5). The primary purpose of art, then, is to 
de-automatize our perception and sense-making: “The removal of this object from the sphere 
of automatized perception is accomplished in art by a variety of means” (6). 
                                                          
6 Several versions as well as several translations into English exist of Shklovsky’s “Art as device”, his key text on 
what he with a neologism called ostranenie. There is a considerable lack of consensus on what term to use in 
English. It has been argued that while the term “defamiliarization” has gained the most scholarly circulation it 
misses out on parts of what the original neologism set out to capture, most recently in an introduction to the 
newest translation, Berlinda’s from 2015 (Shklovsky 2015). In this article we draw mainly on Sher’s translation 
from 1991, however we use the term defamiliarization, rather than his suggested neologism “enstrangement”.  
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Rather than try to establish a catalogue of those means, for instance in the form of a 
formalist poetics, our reading focuses on Shklovsky’s idea of the ends and effects of 
defamiliarisation, on what could be called the rhetorics of defamiliarization. What might be the 
purposes of literature’s tendency to submit readers to anti-efficient perception? Early 
Shklovsky offers what at first sight seems like two radically different answers. The first answer 
is that “the tool of art” has been given to man in order “to make us feel objects”, “to make a 
stone feel stony” (5). The second answer is that “the purpose of art” is to make “perception 
long and “laborious” because “the perceptual process in art has a purpose all of its own” (5). 
So do we undergo processes of defamiliarization in order to escape habitual semiosis and return 
to the realness of reality or do we undergo processes of defamiliarization in order to expand 
and experience semiosis itself? Robinson claims the former: “the reader’s ability to sense or 
feel the slightest deviations from the ideosomatic norm gives literature’s impact on us the 
intensity Shklovsky says we need in order to deautomatize our perceptions, to restore sensation 
to life, to make the stone stony” (Robinson 2008: 127). This notion equals what we call position 
4 in our matrix. The purpose of strange fiction with a low suspension of disbelief is to return 
us to the stonyness of the stone. Margolin, however, could be seen as taking the other position: 
“perceptibility of the medium and its patterns, of the artfulness of the artistic object, is a major 
goal of art” (Margolin 2004: 815). Here, the point of art that suspends disbelief, is to let the 
reader dwell in the artistic process itself, equal to position 2 in the matrix.  
In our view, what seems like an either-or conundrum is better thought of as a both-and 
scenario. Defamiliarization, understood as a state of mind, as a set of cognitive phenomena 
originating from the meeting between aspects of a reader and certain textual phenomena, may 
lead perception beyond or towards itself, may lead out of or further into aspects of a text. It 
may even, and this is where our position differs somewhat from that of Shklovsky, through a 
low degree of familiarity, compared to everyday occurrences, and through a radical suspension 
of disbelief, propel the reader towards parts of the extra-textual that are not easily or not at all 
recognizable or graspable.  
Our reading of Shklovksy’s concept reaffirms what our reflections on 
immersionestablished: defamiliarization is not the opposite of immersion. In some situations 
(position 4), defamiliarization propels the reader through the text and gives her back the thing 
(her “clothes”, her “furniture”, her “fear or war” (Shklovsky 1991: 5)) in its full thingness; in 
other situations (position 2) it offers a form of immersion, not by bracketing out knowledge of 
the artificiality of the invented but by diving into the very process of invention, into the process 
of making and unmaking perception, staged by the work of art. Sher translates this process as 
“the process of creativity” (6, italics in original)7. In others again, it confronts us with repressed 
images or thoughts, realities unheard of, the reality of the absurd or the negative sublime. So 
while defamiliarization describes reading experiences that differ from that of feeling 
transported into another world, it does so by offering different possibilities: some leading back 
to a more real reality, some leading into experiencing and appreciating the artwork’s meta-
perceptional laboratory, and others again that push the reader to experience not the reality but 
the unreality of what lies beyond the text. 
                                                          
7 Robinson translates it as “a way of experiencing the making of a thing” (Robinson 2008: 89, italics in original), 
whereas Berlina suggests “art is the means to live through the making of a thing” (Shklovsky 2015: 162). 
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How do these acts of defamiliarization tie in with what we called “textual phenomena” 
and with the idea of the unnatural as presented in this article? A common thread in Shklovsky’s 
readings of the mystery in Dickens, the parody in Sterne and the digressions in Rozanov is the 
notion of belaboring. To Shklovksy, estrangement is a temporal thing that comes about through 
prolonging, stalling, hindering, intruding and obstructing automatized perception; the erotic 
riddle serves as one of his returning examples. Most of these improper obstructions are to be 
overcome or solved, given proper reader attention and time. We use the term unnatural to 
designate a subset of such devices that readers experience as unsolvable, as producing 
permanent defamiliarization. Using the matrix, these appear in position 2 and 4. An unnatural 
text or unnatural textual elements present “the audience with unsolvable riddles that constantly 
resist recognition, with perpetual unrecognizability” (Iversen 2017: *). Examples from the level 
of the story could be events that both happen and do not happen, impossible temporal or spatial 
constructs, or beings not normalizable by generic conventions (see Iversen 2013a for a reading 
of such devices). On the level of discourse, perpetual unrecognizability may, for instance, result 
from de-automatized types of narrators or narration (“we,” “you,” radically dehumanized “I’s, 
backward narration), or never-ending metaleptic loops.  
We shall now discuss three fictional narratives as a means of illustrating how our 
rethinking of these concepts supports and is supported by this analysis. Although any fictional 
narrative might have served, and there is insufficient space here for us to fully elaborate, our 
case studies represent a broad chronological range, and we move from what appears the most 
mimetic and immersive of the texts to the least, in order to show that despite this, all three make 
use of a range of immersive and defamiliarizing techniques. 
 
The Book of the Duchess  
Like a parapet in a Book of Hours’ illustration that depicts a virtual reader reading the book as 
a model for the actual reader to imitate, the narrator frames our progression into his book. The 
melancholic narrator begins by wondering why nature allows us to suffer. His insomnia leads 
to his reading a story about sleepless Alcyone pining for Ceyx’s return. Alcyone prays to Juno, 
who sends her to sleep and sends a messenger to tell Morpheus to take up Ceyx’s body to 
explain he’s “but deed” (l.204)and consequently Alcyone dies.Omitted is Ovid’s description 
of their metamorphosis into birds. The narrator prays to the Gods for sleep, and awakens in his 
dream in a room filled with birdsong and with scenes from Troy, The Aeneid and The Romance 
of the Rose. He hears the horn of a hunt and sets off with the unsuccessful chase for the “hert” 
(l.381), then follows a black dog into a greenly harmonious forest, counterpointed by a greenly 
lamenting knight in black. Despite eavesdropping, the narrator prompts the knight to explain 
his sorrow to ease it, yet after recounting the failures and eventual success of wooing his 
beloved Blanche, the knight finally simply announces “She is deed” (l.1309). The narrator 
confesses this is pitiful, upon which they part, the knight to his castle, whose bell ringing twelve 
awakens the dreamer.Omitted is any promise of Christian consolation hereafter. The narrator 
finding himself lying in his own bed book in hand decides to put his dream into rhyme, which 
brings the reader abruptly to the end and back to the beginning point at which they entered the 
book, as the homo viator of the dreamworld becomes the homo faber of the storyworld we are 
reading 
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We are immersed in the narrative through a number of techniques. The narrator’s first-
person framing addresses the reader, his emotionally wrought insomnia is a common 
experience, and he is transported first via the supplementary resource of book then by the inner 
world of the dream while physically remaining, like we readers, largely stationary. The 
immersion of the narrator in melancholia, book, and dream, and of characters in the book he 
reads in sleep, dream, and watery underworld are juxtaposed, with the repetition of postures, 
features and motifs across domains. Given the multi-layered nature of medieval poetics, these 
varieties of immersion operate as refracted reflections, which collectively simulate the passive 
engulfment conventionally associated with immersion (and melancholy). Yet the oscillating 
rhythm and moods, more pronounced than in life in general (except through exactly such events 
as grief), continuously jolt the reader into conscious awareness, withthe disorienting and 
revitalizing shifts from dark to light and torpor to haste, as depictions of emotionally saturated 
spaces alternate with vivid sensorimotor triggers. We are shaken from a somnolent soundscape 
of birdsong by the rousing horn of the hunt. Then our immersion via stylistic devices, such as 
alliteration and assonance, that suggestively evoke a soporific gloomy descent into the deadly 
underworld of Morpheus’s cave of sleepers, is punctured by the comically abrupt demand of 
the messenger that they awake: 
 
…“O ho! Awake anon!” 
Hit was for noght; ther herde him non. 
“Awak!” quod he, “who is, lyth there?” 
And blew his horn right in hir ere, 
And cryed “awaketh!” wonder hye.  
This god of slepe, with his oon ye 
Cast up, axed, “who clepeth there?” 
“Hit am I,” quod this messagere…(179-86) 
 
The comedy is thus heightened by the chillingly deadpan response that fails to subdue the 
guileless messenger. The book repetitively shifts us into quiescent immersion in its tale and 
prosody, only to brusquely jostle us awake again through a manoeuvre that while itself vividly 
mimetic is defamiliarizing through its unexpectedness, providing a new perspective on the 
atmosphere cumulatively created (positions 1-2). In this way the narrative causes us to 
revaluate our established perspective on the fictional world, thereby ruffling our accustomed 
perspectives and immersion in the world more generally (position 3) , as is modelled 
intradiegetically by the motivating effect of book and dream on the narrator, as well as by their 
inspiring of wonder and compassion in him (position 4).  
We may feel that a lack of immersion in the superlative top-to-toe list of Blanche’s 
“pre-packaged” features is typical of a modern reader encountering an outdated convention 
(position 2). Yet Helen Phillips general intuition that the focus is on “the emotions of mourners, 
not the fate of the dead” (1982: 30), can be supported by comparison with Jajdelska and 
colleagues’ analysis of a similar description of The Canterbury Tales’ Prioress, which does not 
lead to a vivid experience of a beautiful face so much as to a sense of the describer’s experience 
of it (Jajdelska et al. 2010: 449). So despite the lack of immersion in the referent, this is 
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emotionally engaging because it drolly draws on the tedium of having one newly in-love extol 
their beloved’s wondrousness. In terms of the narrator’s mediation of our engagement with the 
narrative, Schaeffer can contribute further: it is “our look itself that is saturated with emotion: 
very often immersion is engaged there not so much through our empathy with what is 
represented…as through our identification with a subject that sees, that looks, that is in the 
position of a witness (or even a voyeur)” (161). The narrator’s persistent metadiegetic asides 
disrupt and inflect our reading. He parodies himself as boastful author, moved reader, curious 
wanderer and guileless voyeur; emotionally reflects on the story and dreamworld action and 
their relation to his own state; and presents a spiralling process that extends out towards the 
reader: we loop round from the narrator’s reading, to his writing, to our reading his book, as 
the inner storyworld and dreamworld Mobius-like become the story told by the presenting 
narrator who addresses us. 
Though not the view presented here, unnatural narratology has been used to describe 
narrative’s deviation from real world processes or from expected generic conventions in the 
story world (Alber et al. 2013). So while fairy tales do not accord with real world processes, to 
the extent that the motifs and plots were conventionalised within the genre they could be argued 
to not be defamiliarizing. Conversely, The Book of the Duchess provides an instance where 
what might be termed defamiliarizing is its deviation from generic literary (and theological) 
conventions exactly because of its realistic portrayal of the experience of grief and loss. In a 
conventional medieval dream vision, such as The Pearl, the inconsolable dreamer dreams of 
the lost beloved and is reconciled to their loss (Spearing 51; Phillips 1982: 13-27). This is an 
unnatural text to the extent that it presents the readers with the unsolvable question of death 
and refuses conventional closures, instead creating a yawning metaleptic loop. The jarring 
nature of this otherworldly omission is signalled by frequent use and misuse of theological or 
philosophical references; such as, the birds’ “solempne servyse” (302). The book stands in to 
save him from death (221-4), but it would be reductive to read the work as just an allegory of 
reading and its value, as a plethora of intertwined causes and issues are left hanging. Lines 
between fiction and fact are blurred, since this is a portrayal of John of Gaunt’s suffering after 
the loss of his wife Blanche. Yet the bell that awakens the dreamer is in the dream: the 
awakening out of melancholic immersion is through a partly book-borne dream vision of the 
ever shifting joys and sorrows that weave the pattern of our waking world. 
 
“The Circular Ruins” 
In some textual encounters, defamiliarization, even of the permanent unnatural kind, may offer 
its own kinds of immersive effects, transporting the reader into the very “process of creativity”, 
as Shklovksy calls attention directed towards the textual or aesthetic mechanics. We suggest 
reading “The Circular Ruins”, a short story by Borges, as a meditation (on a meditation) on 
how such a dual complicity of processes of immersion and sustained defamiliarization operate 
in certain situations.   
“The Circular Ruins” tells the story of a man, completely driven by a single purpose: 
he wants to “dream a man” and “insert him into reality” (Borges 2007: 46). The progression of 
the narrative is crucial to its effects. During his first attempt at transforming “the incoherent 
and vertiginous matter dreams are made of” into an actual being, the protagonist sees himself 
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as a teacher, first of many, then later only of one extremely talented pupil. Insomnia, however, 
sets in, thwarting this approach. After having given up on dreaming, a second attempt begins 
with the dreaming protagonist now in the role of a sculpting perceiver, looking at and forming 
first a heart, then a skeleton then slowly a complete male anatomy. This “complete man”, 
however, remains completely immobile, he is “dreamt as asleep” and “unskilful and crude and 
elementary” (48). In order to breathe life into this phantom the protagonist dreams of a god 
whose earthly name is “Fire”. Its incarnations are ever changing: “it was not an atrocious 
mongrel of tiger and horse, but both these vestments at once and also a bull, a rose, a tempest” 
(48), and it is capable of giving life to the “sleeping phantom” in such a way that anyone would 
“believe him to be a man of flesh and blood” (48). The only exception to this man’s life-likeness 
is that fire will know him as a phantom and thus not burn him. Shortly after, the dreamt one 
who is now referred to by the protagonist as “my son” and “the boy” wakes up and begins 
performing actions outside of the dreams of the protagonist – the phantom has transcended 
from the realm of the protagonist’s dreams to the realm of the protagonist’s reality. As a 
consequence, the protagonist’s “life’s purpose” is “complete”, at least until a group of men 
approaches him and tells the story of a nearby magic man who is able to walk on fire without 
being burned. This story fills the protagonist with doubts and fear, for he can think of nothing 
worse than for the creation of his dreams to discover the unreal nature of his being: “not to be 
a man, to be the projection of another man’s dream, what a feeling of humiliation, of vertigo!” 
(50). “The Circular Ruins” ends on a highly dramatic note: fire erupts in the ruins where the 
protagonist stays. While initially prepared to die in the flames, the protagonist to his “relief”, 
“humiliation”, and “horror”, instead discovers that he is only “caressed” by the engulfing 
flames, and so that he too is “a mere appearance, dreamt by another” (50).  
The narrative progression of the short story, and the effects produced by its surprise 
ending, rest on three assumptions about the storyworld, assumptions that readers are led to 
construct during the unfolding of story, only to have them deconstructed by the ending. First, 
the reader is led to suspend disbelief in the possibility of dreaming forth a being in this 
particular textual world, as the text itself explicitly states, it is “not impossible,” only 
“supernatural” (46). Secondly, the story of the protagonist’s project contains many elements 
that are conducive to immersion in the created storyworld. Apart from the supernatural nature 
of the project and apart from the information given in the very last sentence of the story, the 
protagonist’s life reads like a recognizable if somewhat eccentric existence. He purposefully 
seeks out geographic and social marginalization, and while arguably sleeping more than most, 
he still appears attuned to human needs and habits: he eats, feels, thinks, exhibits and acts on 
known desires and beliefs. Thirdly, the progress of the story draws a clear line of demarcation 
between two spheres of being, the real/reality and the dream/the imagined, and these are 
hierarchically ordered with the former depicted as controlling the latter. The real is the realm 
of canoes, of temple ruins, of mountain tops, and of the awake protagonist, whereas the 
imagined or dreamt is the realm of bodies being slowly sculpted, of talking gods, and of 
sleeping phantoms and of the protagonist dreaming. The supernatural quality of the 
protagonist’s project comes from him wanting to cross this line of demarcation the other way, 
by bringing a dream into the realm of the real instead of just being a real being entering into a 
dream.  
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 Going back to Coleridge’s challenge, quoted earlier – to suspend disbelief when 
experiencing “shadows of imagination” – one might see the old man not only as accepting but 
also as radicalizing this challenge. By pouring all his intellectual and emotional resources into 
the act of dreaming, his purpose is to move beyond suspension of disbelief into producing 
actual belief; attempting to materialise the creative act by producing an embodied form. Up 
until the final sentence, his project moves towards completion, with the dream serving as a 
controllable resource and as a means to an end, with the reader invited to immerse herself into 
the project’s progression. What becomes apparent in the final sentence is that the dream is not 
a means at all but an end (or more precisely an ever-returning beginning). Instead of securing 
the ontological hierarchy between dreamer and dreamt, the last words of the story create an 
unsolvable riddle of infinite regress by revealing that the dreamer himself is dreamt. The 
mimetic immersion produced by the narrative’s progression is a prerequisite for the reader to 
experience the horror and shock of the protagonist’s discovery; we understand the old man’s 
vertigious state by ourselves undergoing a destabilizing manoeuvre. Yet this manoeuvre leads 
the reader to experience yet another kind of immersion, one that no longer suspends but instead 
revels in disbelief: rather than a maker, dreaming something to life, we end up witnessing an 
endless chain of dreamt dreamers. The immersion thereby shifts from experiencing something 
seemingly real making something unreal into experiencing how both the seemingly real and 
the manifestly unreal share the same, ultimately invented characteristics. Thanks to this 
permanently defamiliarized textual riddle, the attention of the reader turn towards what 
Shklovsky called the “process of creativity”, towards, in this case quite literally, the “making 
of a thing” rather than towards the thing itself.  
 
“The Country Doctor” 
In both The Book of the Duchess and “The Circular Ruins” the I that has the dream is also an I 
created by a dream. Through the dream in Chaucer’s text, the protagonist learns about the 
nature of grief and loss, while Borges’ protagonist turns out to be able not only to create from 
a dream but is created from dream, a discovery that produces grief, in this case in the 
protagonist’s ontological loss of himself. Even a cursory look at the reception of our final case, 
Kafka’s “The Country Doctor”, suggests that this is also a text about dreams: several readings 
focus on the topic, for instance “Dreams of Interpretation: On the Sources of Kafka’s 
“Landarzt”” (Campbell 1987), “Franz Kafka: A Country Doctor: The Narrator as Dreamer” 
(Stockholder 1978), and “Impossible worlds”, where Ryan refers to the text as a “prime 
example of a narrative with a dream-like reality” (Ryan 2012: 377). It should be noted, 
however, that this focus on dreams is not directly corroborated by the actual content of the 
narrative. Nowhere does the text explicitly mention dreams or the act of dreaming. Yet it is not 
difficult to see why some readers take recourse to forms of analysis associated with dream 
interpretation upon encountering the narrative’s disjointed, fragmented semantic clustering, 
typically associated with dreams, as a means to maximize the relevance and to ease the capacity 
to comprehend Kafka’s text. In it and through it, permanent defamiliarization gapes.  
 From a distance, something akin to a progression is observable in the text. The 
beginning of the discourse resembles the beginning of a story, in that we are presented with a 
narrator, the country doctor, who “is completely at a loss” on his way out to a late call. The 
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doctor appears in possession of everything necessary – “a carriage”, “light”, “medical bag”, 
“fur coat” (60) and a purpose for his journey; he has everything expect a horse. By the end of 
the discourse, after having visited the patient, a boy who at first wants to “die” even though the 
doctor finds him “healthy”, but then later turns out to have “an open wound the size of a 
palmprint” (63) in his side, the narrator has horses, but now lacks everything else. He wanders 
“aimlessly around”, naked in “the frost” (65), thus making the first sentence of the discourse, 
being “completely at a loss”, serve more comprehensively as a description of the final state of 
the story. While the text consists of mostly recognizable elements – a doctor, a patient, sickness, 
horses, conversations, travel, relations between people, feelings of panic and uncertainty – they 
seem to conform to different rules than those guiding our everyday understanding, as does the 
ways in which they interact in the text. The space of the presented world is simultaneously too 
vast and too confined: the patient is supposed to be “ten miles away”, yet his “yard opened up 
right in front of” the doctor’s “own gate” (61-62). The identities and physical appearances of 
the persons and animals are blurred and strangely interchangeable: the patient first appears 
well, then suddenly has an “open wound” (63); the doctor takes the place of the patient; the 
groom in the stables is crawling on all four like an animal and bites Rosa, the maid; the horses 
“have thrust open the windows” (62) to look in on the sick boy’s room. The causal links 
between the events of the story are sketchy at best: during the nightly visit, a choir of 
schoolchildren suddenly show up and sing “an extremely simple song” (64) to the now 
undressed doctor. The homodiegetic narrator seems too detached and too attached to the events, 
as even though his trip begins with a purpose, things continue to happen to him rather than 
because of him, and to the other characters, as even though the groom lives in the doctor’s 
stables, he is a ”stranger”, and the doctor has to “save” Rosa even though she has lived in his 
house “without [him] noticing her” (61).   
While some of the epistemological uncertainties arising from the events and the 
reactions to them could be said to resemble a dreamlike state, others do not. At times the 
narrator appears acutely aware of the strangeness he finds himself immersed in, yet at others 
he offers gnostic utterances and aphorisms: “writing prescriptions is easy, but all other 
communication with people are difficult” (63), “That’s how people are where I live” (63). 
These features, combined with the fact that the text does not include any direct references to 
dreaming or sleeping, makes the dream-interpretations not very convincing attempts at 
naturalizing the text. Whatever this doctor is immersed in, it is not something he is about to 
wake up from.  
In “The Circular Ruins”, the unnatural element, the unsolvable riddle gains much of its 
effect through a meticulous design and implementation. Anyone reading that text will be 
sucked into its black (w)hole and experience its particular vertigo by reliving the deconstruction 
of ontological hierarchies of creation and being. By contrast, “The Country Doctor” contains a 
fragmented plethora of defamiliarizing elements and what is more important, these dispersed 
riddles do not add up to a whole, not even a black one. Kafka’s text does not lend itself to 
allegorical readings, not because of a lack of semantic layers, but because of too many. The 
events and the narrator’s reactions to the events are too strange, erratic, and sudden to sustain 
suspension of disbelief over any length of time. The incitements to become immersed are there 
initially and reappear in glimpses but despite these local pockets of potential engulfment, 
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globally familiarity continues to erode. The reader, like the country doctor, ends up in a state 
of permanent irresolution, which is produced through a process of epistemological 
defamiliarization that obstructs immersion in the invented world, in the act of creativity, and 
in the world outside the text.  
 
Conclusion 
In this article we have aimed to bring into dialogue insights from both cognitive and unnatural 
narratology, without smoothing away their specific features, their underlying formation and 
overarching commitments, or flattening the diverse voices, that together give these movements 
shape and impetus. Cognitive research has begun to give us insights into the ways in which a 
broad range of mental states and processes can be generated by language, and into the 
continuities and variations between real life versus narrative experience and across different 
forms of media. Unnatural narratology makes evident the importance of aspects of texts that 
refuse closure, and by reexamining Shklovsky’s description of defamiliarization we hope to 
have shown that it has a wider range of functions than previously argued. Notions of 
defamiliarization have been shown to be intertwined with immersion from the emergence of 
hermeneutics in vernacular medieval literature, and is also evident in cognitive approaches, 
particularly those which emerge from phenomenological roots. All of our case studies 
thematise immersion and defamiliarization and present narrators whose acts of creation and of 
suspending disbelief image within the narrative our experiences and engagement as readers. 
What has become most apparent and what we have attempted to convey through the matrix is 
the complex range of positions, responses and vectors that immersion and defamiliarization 
rely on and produce, through ranging between suspending disbelief to the puncturing of any 
such suspension, either primarily in relation to the fictional narrative or the world before us. 
Narrative experience is created through textual techniques that trigger a range of cognitive 
mechanisms in the reader, so that rather than just being lost in the text, the reader is 
reconstituted by the narrative, in either trivial or substantial ways, as they themselves 
reconstitute it. The reader is distributed across the realms of world, book and storyworld, with 
different aspects of the self sometimes more grounded or directed consciously or non-
consciously towards one than the other in complex, nuanced and potentially creative fusions 
and fissions.  
Led by a shared interest in sharpening our understanding of reader engagements with 
strange or unconventional literary texts, we have focused on an area where potential for 
synthesis exists between the fields of cognitive and unnatural narratology. Alongside what has 
turned out to be, we think, productive conceptual agreements concerning the different types of 
interdependencies between immersion and defamiliarization, methodological and 
interpretative disagreements were also evident even if they have not been given centre stage. 
The two theoretical sections clearly hint at some of them. Cognitive narratology is influenced 
by research from cognitive science and philosophy of mind combined with the traditional close 
reading of texts. The interest in unnatural narratives presented here opts for a more 
hermeneutical (partly post-hermeneutical) approach, substantiated through a close reading of a 
classic text from the field of literary aesthetics. Dormant disagreements on a methodological 
level could be about the relevance of bringing (or not bringing) results from the cognitive 
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sciences to bear on the understanding of literary texts. Likewise, interpretative or rhetorical 
disagreements could be lurking behind the way our different reader interests ultimately attach 
meaning and value to the texts in question. Despite such discordances, we end on a constructive 
note. Not only can these two still developing theories of how and why literary narratives 
function in the way they do be fruitfully brought into dialogue; they are important resources 
for getting at why literature gets us.    
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